Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition on the proposed modernisation of European copyright rules. Part B: Exceptions and Limitations. Chapter 1: Text and Data Mining (Article 3 COM(2016) 593) by Hilty, Reto M & Richter, Heiko








Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition on the proposed modernisation of European copyright rules.
Part B: Exceptions and Limitations. Chapter 1: Text and Data Mining
(Article 3 COM(2016) 593)
Hilty, Reto M; Richter, Heiko




Hilty, Reto M; Richter, Heiko (2017). Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation
and Competition on the proposed modernisation of European copyright rules. Part B: Exceptions and
Limitations. Chapter 1: Text and Data Mining (Article 3 COM(2016) 593). München: Max Planck
Institute for Innovation and Competition.
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
 
Directors: Prof. Dr. Reto M. Hilty (Management), Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Ph.D., Prof. Dr. Josef Drexl 
Marstallplatz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany Phone +49 89 24246-0, Fax +49 89 24246-501, institut@ip.mpg.de, www.ip.mpg.de 
Position Statement of the  
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PART B 
Exceptions and Limitations 
Chapter 1 
Text and Data Mining  
(Article 3 COM(2016) 593) 
Version 1.1 
I. Introduction 
1. Text and data mining (TDM) refers to comparatively new analysis tech-
niques to automatically assess large amounts of digital information by means 
of computers, thereby generating new knowledge (in particular by identifying 
correlations or trends). TDM is applied in a wide range of fields: in the social 
sciences, humanities and natural sciences, such as pharmaceutical and medical 
research, and in journalism, but also in the private sector, for example in finan-
cial industries or for the purpose of market research. 
2. The Commission’s intention to exempt TDM from licensing for research pur-
poses is, in principle, to be welcomed. A clear legal framework avoids the 
complicated rights clearance between the parties involved and reduces invest-
ment risks. The innovation effect will likely be immense in view of the rapidly 
growing importance of data analysis techniques. It is also positive to see the 
European legislature taking the initiative, as this prevents a fragmentation of 
the law. 
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II. The Commission’s proposal 
1. Content 
3. Article 3(1) of the Draft Directive provides for an exception for reproductions 
pursuant to Article 2 of Directive 2001/29 (InfoSoc Directive) and extractions 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of Directive 96/9 (Database Directive) in order to carry 
out TDM for the purposes of scientific research (defined in Article 2(1)). The 
prerequisite is that the respective research organization has lawful access to the 
sources searched. The exception is limited to not-for-profit research and re-
search with a public interest objective. According to Article 3(2), contrary con-
tractual provisions are unenforceable. Furthermore, rightholders shall be al-
lowed to apply technical measures to ensure the security and integrity of net-
works and databases (Article 3(3)). Rightholders and research organizations 
should agree on good practices (Article 3(4)). 
4. Similar regulation has already been enacted, inter alia, in the United Kingdom 
in 2014 for non-commercial research. In Germany, corresponding proposals 
are discussed in the context of the debate on the research exemption (de la Du-
rantaye, Allgemeine Bildungs- und Wissenschaftsschranke, 2014; in favor of a 
broader scope, however, Schack, ZUM 2016, 266, 269; about the general legal 
situation of TDM Spindler, GRUR 2016, 1112, 1117). 
5. The draft refers to reproductions (Article 2 InfoSoc Directive) and extractions 
(Article 7(1) Database Directive) as affected exploitation rights. If TDM were 
considered to be relevant for copyright (see, for example, Spindler, “Text und 
Data Mining – urheber- und datenschutzrechtliche Fragen”, GRUR 2016, 
1112; Stamatoudi, “Text and Data Mining”, in: Stamatoudi (ed.), New Devel-
opments in EU and International Copyright Law, 2016, 253; Triaille et al., 
Study on the legal framework of text and data mining (TDM), 2014), then this 
would be consistent. In fact, TDM usually requires a not merely temporary re-
production, for which Article 5(1)(a) InfoSoc Directive would not apply. 
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2. Concerns regarding the regulatory method 
6. However, the proposed rule wrongly suggests that carrying out TDM is per se 
of relevance to copyright. The explanations given in Recital 8, according to 
which an authorization to undertake such acts must be obtained from 
rightholders if no exception or limitation applies, are too sweeping. Especially 
in the case that a user has lawful access to contents (the user has acquired the 
relevant data as such or has acquired access to them on a contractual basis), the 
automated analysis of these contents must be permitted, just as reading by the 
human being does not require any separate consent by the rightholder.  
7. The illusionary protection thus suggested has an effect, in particular, in those 
cases in which the contractual agreement between the rightholder and the user 
does not contain any express provisions on TDM. The proposed limitation 
would allow for the conclusion e contrario that TDM is a separable type of 
use. An omission in a contract would therefore have to be interpreted in the 
sense that the contractually granted right does not refer to TDM. 
8. The consequences of such a wrong conclusion are far-reaching, since the pro-
posed rule allows TDM to be carried out only by not-for-profit research organ-
izations and research organizations acting directly in the public interest. This 
would force users of TDM to conclude contractual agreements with the 
rightholders for commercial purposes and for research not in the public inter-
est. This lacks a substantive justification (see para. 10-12) and also leads to 
complex questions of demarcation in the legal practice. As a result of the dif-
ferent national implementations to be expected, the fragmentation of law in the 
internal market would be pushed even further, which is contrary to the declared 
objective of the Union-wide harmonization of the law. 
9. In addition, the general role model effect of such a rule is to be viewed with 
skepticism regarding the development of the data-driven economy: TDM is to 
be considered only as a first, albeit an important, data analysis technique. 
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Submitting TDM to an isolated copyright rule would lead to a fragmentary and 
incoherent legal development in the longer run. Instead, only holistic regulato-
ry approaches that accommodate overarching interrelations of interests can ac-
count for the societal and economic significance of data analyses. 
3. Concerns regarding the content 
10. The Draft Directive assumes that TDM is of particular benefit to scientific re-
search and, in particular, creates incentives for innovation. While this is true, 
this must not, however, lead to the conclusion that TDM does not bear the 
same high potential for innovation and discovery for purposes beyond scien-
tific research, e.g. for start-ups, journalists or information intermediaries. 
11. Even within the field of research, however, the Commission intends to limit 
the scope of the proposed provision to not-for-profit research organizations and 
to those pursuing a public-interest objective recognized by a Member State. 
The latter raises delimitation problems and so does the specific goal to submit 
public-private partnerships to the provision. Although the draft aims to add 
contour to the rule by giving a definition (Article 2(1)), this definition uses a 
large number of legal terms that are vague or to be further defined, which will 
most likely lead to lengthy court procedures involving the CJEU as an inter-
preting instance. 
12. Including profit-oriented – and also purely private – research in a provision 
on TDM would avoid not only the aforementioned delimitation problems. 
More importantly, this would strengthen the position of research-based compa-
nies in the European Union against their competitors who are not subjected to 
similar restrictions.  
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III. Alternative regulatory proposal 
1. TDM as normal use 
13. Against the background of these concerns, an alternative regulatory proposal is 
presented here. In the first place, the proposal is based on the fact that the per-
formance of TDM as such – as described at the outset (see para. 6) – has no 
more relevance under copyright than any other kind of use of the work, in par-
ticular the reading and comprehension of connections by a human being. Just 
as reading corresponds to the normal use of analogue written works (this 
awareness of contents does not conflict with copyright), the normal use of 
digitally stored content lies – in the light of today’s technologies – in auto-
matically finding and correlating the information it contains. In a sense compa-
rable, Article 5(3) of Directive 2009/24 (Software Directive) defines the nor-
mal use of computer programs such that “[t]he person having a right to use a 
copy of a computer program shall be entitled, without the authorization of the 
rightholder, to observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to 
determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program“ 
(see also Recital 13). 
14. However, the special feature of TDM is that the actual process of TDM itself is 
usually preceded by a reproduction, since the datasets involved are usually 
available in different formats and must therefore be normalized for the purpose 
of the comprehensive automated search (and, as the case may be, undergo a 
taxonomy). At first sight, this process is comparable to so-called “format-
shifting” (for example, from an analogue to a digital carrier), which inevitably 
leads to a reproduction. 
15. Depending on the sources on which the TDM is based, databases that are pro-
tected subject-matter under the Database Directive can also be affected. The 
stated normalization might constitute an extraction, which requires consent, 
and is defined as “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial 
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
6 of 27 
part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any 
form” (Art. 7(2)(a) Database Directive).  
16. Neither the necessary extraction from databases nor the reproduction resulting 
from the required normalization allows the user an independent use, however 
(unlike e.g. format-shifting). Rather, these processes are technically necessary 
in order to carry out TDM at all, just as, for example, a reproduction is una-
voidable for the use of software. For this reason, Article 5(1) of the Software 
Directive provides that a permanent or temporary reproduction of software ac-
cording to Article 4(1)(a) of the same Directive “shall not require authorization 
by the rightholder where they are necessary for the use of the computer pro-
gram”. Thus, in relation to the very broad concept of reproduction in Art. 2 of 
the InfoSoc Directive, a specific field exemption is created that goes beyond 
the much narrower rationale of Art. 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
17. Nothing else applies regarding TDM, as far as concerns content to which the 
persons performing the mining have lawful access. In other words, the regula-
tory model suggested here constitutes another specific field exemption based 
on the fact that the performance of TDM as such, like acts under Art. 5(3) of 
the Software Directive, does not require the consent of the rightholder. In order 
to be able to carry out TDM at all, however, reproductions are just as necessary 
as they are permitted to the lawful user of software pursuant to Article 5(1) of 
the Software Directive. This means that Art. 2 InfoSoc Directive does not cov-
er such reproductions. The same applies with regard to certain extractions from 
database contents that are necessary for the purposes of TDM. 
18. The proposed regulatory model does not entitle any third party to carry out 
TDM, but only the user to whom the rightholder has granted access to the 
sources affected by it. Just as a rightholder who allows users to use software 
must assume that reproductions and other actions according to Article 5(1) and 
(3) of the Software Directive are performed, the rightholder must assume that 
TDM is carried out if he allows access to sources in a manner that enables 
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TDM. Therefore, in principle, an “implied license” is to be assumed – compa-
rable to the provision in the Software Directive (Grützmacher, in: Wandt-
ke/Bullinger, UrhR, 4th edition, § 69d, para. 3 with further references). 
19. Thus, the purpose of the proposed rule is primarily to determine the permissi-
ble range of divergent contractual arrangements, in particular those which 
would prohibit TDM. The rule constitutes an indispensable core of permitted 
acts of the intended user, as it renders contrary contractual terms void (in this 
sense, Article 8(2) of the Software Directive). Article 3(2) of the Commis-
sion’s Draft Directive also reflects this concern. 
20. The decisive reason for the fact that those users who have legal access to the 
sources used must be able to carry out TDM without the consent of the 
rightholder lies in the fact that the rightholder does not need to take any spe-
cific actions to enable TDM. Rather, the user can basically perform the above-
mentioned normalization himself, even if this is neither necessary nor particu-
larly meaningful or efficient. 
2. Advanced business models on a contractual basis 
21. Against this background, new business models are available to the righthold-
ers (such as scientific publishers), who have so far used them in rather isolated 
cases in relation to certain TDM-driven industries. Such industries, as well as 
researchers, may prefer not to undertake the normalization step themselves, but 
to involve a specialized third party. Should those users who are not specialized 
and who have lawful access to the recorded content perform the normalization 
themselves, this does not simply produce a dataset that is necessary to achieve 
optimal results of TDM. This primarily opens up the possibility for the 
rightholders to technically process content designated by users, who can then 
directly carry out TDM. 
22. Such services, however, relate only to the necessary preparatory measures, 
namely to the normalization and the corresponding reproductions. In this re-
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spect, the abovementioned field exemption for the benefit of legitimate users 
does not come into play. However, this does not alter the fact that the actual 
TDM does not require the consent of the rightholder, since this does not consti-
tute a copyright-relevant use of works from the outset (on this, see para. 6). It 
is true that a rightholder will demand compensation for the normalization of 
data; but such compensation does not refer to the TDM itself. In other words, 
the use of the service of the rightholder simply means that the user who has 
lawful access to the contents covered does not make the necessary reproduc-
tions himself, but this does not change the principle that TDM in itself is per-
mitted without the need for consent. 
23. Rightholders still remain free to differentiate the prices for such services pro-
vided on a contractual basis. This can be justified in situations where commer-
cial users perform TDM to increase their chances in competition and to achieve 
corresponding profits. Such users in particular are already working together 
with rightholders (for example with scientific publishers), with corresponding 
business models under development. Against this background as well, it is not 
clear why commercial users should not be included in the proposed provision. 
Profit-oriented users will primarily follow efficiency considerations for decid-
ing how to carry out TDM. They will often prefer appropriate services of 
rightholders to their own, more complex normalizations of content, even if 
they have access to it. 
24. Under the proposed rules, rightholders are also not exposed to excessive com-
petition. Only the user who has his own lawful access to the recorded content 
and who wants to carry out the actual TDM himself is allowed to make the re-
productions required for TDM. This excludes the possibility for third parties to 
offer similar services and to thus compete with the rightholders. Though third 
parties may gain access to a wide range of content, they do not fall under the 
field exemption from the general rights of reproduction and extraction pro-
posed here as long as they do not carry out TDM themselves. 
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3. TDM related to non-accessible content 
25. A particular problem faced by research organizations relates to TDM of con-
tent to which there is no (lawful) access. Smaller research organizations, in 
particular, with only limited access to content, are already facing the challenge 
of being able to compete internationally. This problem will be exacerbated by 
the fact that the field exemption for TDM requires lawful access, thus effec-
tively increasing the lead of the fewer, large and financially strong research or-
ganizations. 
26. Research organizations must therefore also be able to carry out TDM without 
having to acquire access to the content themselves. In fact, in practice certain 
providers of content already provide normalized datasets for the purpose of 
TDM without giving the users access to the content. Rather, the actual access 
to scientific content must be acquired (and paid for) separately. Indeed, the 
provision of normalized data solely for the purpose of TDM is a business mod-
el, especially since a rightholder will either offer this service for payment or 
hopes for other, indirect profit opportunities. However, this practice is far from 
being comprehensive, and – as far as can be seen – it has not yet been devel-
oped with research organizations in mind at all (see for a recent overview of 
the TDM policies of scientific research publishers Casper/Guibault, Baseline 
report of policies and barriers of TDMs in Europe, 2016, p. 84 et seq.). How-
ever, such a practice would be of particular interest and benefit, given the stat-
ed limited access to scientific research information. 
27. Accordingly, the proposed provision obliges rightholders to provide datasets 
to research organizations (as defined in Article 2 of the Draft Directive) that 
exclusively allow them to carry out TDM. This obligation applies, of course, 
only to those rightholders who market content primarily for research purposes. 
The provision does not stipulate how this provision of datasets is to be imple-
mented in particular. Rather, it is sufficient if the obligation creates incentives 
for self-regulation. The more open the provision is, the more likely it is to al-
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
10 of 27 
low co-operation between rightholders of complementary content with regard 
to such business models. 
28. Such an obligation can be justified by the fact that the rightholders are entitled 
to request a reasonable payment for the provision of their normalized data. 
What is crucial is that the normalized data provided can only serve as a substi-
tute for access to the actual content to a limited extent. The mere possibility to 
perform TDM does not, however, replace the knowledge of a particular re-
search discipline’s current state. TDM is merely a possible research approach, 
which, however, is particularly important because the knowledge gained can be 
the subject of new publications. If this modern research approach is not to be 
hampered by a lack of factual availability of normalized data, it is indispensa-
ble that TDM also be made possible with respect to content that is not lawfully 
accessible. A residual risk may be seen in the fact that TDM-capable data sets 
could be used (and e.g. “converted back”) in a way that would allow for the 
substitution of access to the content. However, this does not only require a cer-
tain amount of effort; the back-conversion would ultimately also constitute a 
reproduction on the part of the party to which the TDM-capable data sets have 
been made available. However, such a reproduction lacks not only the contrac-
tual consent of the concerned rightholders, but also a statutory authorization. A 
back-conversion of purely TDM-capable data sets would therefore be illegal. 
4. The need and importance of technical protection measures 
29. It goes without saying that access to the networks and databases of rightholders 
for the purpose of TDM is associated with certain risks. This applies in princi-
ple irrespective of whether the user has lawful access to the content or not, 
since the marketing of scientific information in particular nowadays often no 
longer requires permanent data transfers. Accordingly, a rightholder must be 
able to protect his legitimate interests by taking certain technical measures. 
However, such measures must not go beyond what is required, i.e. technical 
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protection measures must be precluded from making TDM unnecessarily more 
difficult or even de facto impossible. 
5. Storage and accessibility  
30. In so far as the rightholders themselves carry out the normalization of the data 
and only provide them for the purpose of the TDM, they have the power to ex-
clude unauthorized uses of these data. If, on the other hand, normalization is 
carried out by those users who carry out TDM, the dataset remains under their 
control, provided that it is not destroyed after the TDM has been carried out. If, 
in principle, this is a reproduction (para. 14), for which the proposed standard 
provides for a field exemption for the benefit of the party that intends to carry 
out TDM, it follows that such datasets may not be left in the hands of third par-
ties. Accordingly, they are to be stored in such a way as to prevent unauthor-
ized uses by third parties. 
31. Conversely, in both cases, a very important question for practice is whether 
there is any obligation to retain the corresponding datasets after TDM has been 
carried out. In the field of scientific research there is a particularly strong in-
terest in the verifiability of research results. This may determine that the 
relevant datasets have to be retained and made available for the purpose of ver-
ification, unless it can be ensured that re-normalization and repeated TDM 
leads to in identical results. If it is necessary to store the datasets used in the re-
search, all Member States must have facilities for storing the relevant datasets 
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IV. Proposal 
Article 3 
Text and data mining 
(1) 
1A person is allowed, without the rightholder’s consent, to carry out text 
and data mining related to works or other subject-matter to which this person 
has lawful access. 
2
This includes, for the sole purpose of text and data mining, 
the permission to extract contents of databases and to make reproductions. 
(2) 
1
Rightholders who market works or other subject-matter primarily for re-
search purposes are obliged to provide research organizations not having law-
ful access with datasets that enable them to carry out text and data mining only. 
2
These rightholders may request a reasonable payment. 
(3) Any contractual provision contrary to the rights and obligations provided 
for in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 shall be unenforceable. 
(4) 
1
Rightholders shall be allowed to apply measures necessary to ensure the 
security and integrity of the networks and databases. 
2
Such measures shall not 
unnecessarily hamper text and data mining. 
(5) The Member States shall designate a facility to safely store datasets used 




 Munich, February 22, 2017 
 
  
 Authors:  Prof. Dr. Reto M. Hilty 
   Heiko Richter, LL.M.  
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
13 of 27 
Annex: Synopsis German – English 








1 I. Einführung   
Text- und Data-Mining (TDM) bezeichnet 
vergleichsweise neue Analysetechniken, 
große Mengen digitaler Informationen au-
tomatisiert mit Hilfe von Computern aus-
zuwerten, um dadurch neues Wissen (insbe-
sondere durch die Identifikation von Zu-
sammenhängen oder Trends) zu erzeugen. 
TDM findet Anwendung in verschiedensten 
Feldern: in den Sozial-, Geistes- und Na-
turwissenschaften, so etwa in der pharma-
zeutischen und medizinischen Forschung, 
im Journalismus, aber auch in der Privat-
wirtschaft, etwa im Finanzsektor oder zu 
Zwecken der Marktforschung. 
I. Introduction 
Text and data mining (TDM) refers to 
comparatively new analysis techniques to 
automatically assess large amounts of digital 
information by means of computers, thereby 
generating new knowledge (in particular by 
identifying correlations or trends). TDM is 
applied in a wide range of fields: in the so-
cial sciences, humanities and natural scienc-
es, such as pharmaceutical and medical re-
search, and in journalism, but also in the 
private sector, for example in financial in-
dustries or for the purpose of market re-
search. 
2 Das Anliegen der Kommission, TDM zu 
Forschungszwecken lizenzfrei zu stellen, ist 
grundsätzlich zu begrüßen. Ein eindeuti-
ger Rechtsrahmen erspart eine komplizierte 
Rechteklärung zwischen den beteiligten 
Akteuren und reduziert Investitionsunsi-
cherheit. Der Innovationseffekt dürfte ange-
sichts der rapide wachsenden Bedeutung 
von Daten-Analysetechniken als immens 
einzustufen sein. Ebenfalls ist begrüßens-
wert, dass gerade der europäische Gesetz-
geber die Initiative ergreift, was einer 
Rechtszersplitterung vorbeugt.  
The Commission’s intention to exempt 
TDM from licensing for research purposes 
is, in principle, to be welcomed. A clear 
legal framework avoids the complicated 
rights clearance between the parties in-
volved and reduces investment risks. The 
innovation effect will likely be immense in 
view of the rapidly growing importance of 
data analysis techniques. It is also positive to 
see the European legislature taking the initi-
ative, as this prevents a fragmentation of the 
law. 
3 II. Zum Vorschlag der Kommission 
1. Inhalt 
Art. 3 Abs. 1 RL-Entwurf verlangt eine 
Ausnahme für Vervielfältigungen nach 
Art. 2 der RL 2001/29 (InfoSoc-RL) sowie 
Entnahmen nach Art. 7 Abs. 1 der RL 96/9 
(Datenbank-RL) sofern dies im Rahmen 
von TDM erfolgt, das zu Zwecken der wis-
senschaftlichen Forschung eingesetzt wird 
II. The Commission’s proposal 
1. Content 
Article 3(1) of the Draft Directive provides 
for an exception for reproductions pursuant 
to Article 2 of Directive 2001/29 (InfoSoc 
Directive) and extractions pursuant to Arti-
cle 7(1) of Directive 96/9 (Database Di-
rective) in order to carry out TDM for the 
purposes of scientific research (defined in 
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(definiert in Art. 2 Abs. 1). Voraussetzung 
ist, dass die jeweilige Forschungsorganisa-
tion rechtmäßig Zugang zu den durchsuch-
ten Quellen hat. Die Ausnahme beschränkt 
sich auf nicht-gewinnorientierte For-
schung und auf solche, die der Erfüllung 
eines staatlich anerkannten Auftrages dient. 
Entgegenstehende Vertragsbestimmungen 
sind nach Art. 3 Abs. 2 unwirksam. Ferner 
ist die Anwendung von technischen 
Schutzmaßnahmen durch die Rechteinhaber 
möglich,  welche die Sicherheit und Integri-
tät der Netze und Datenbanken gewährleis-
ten (Art. 3 Abs. 3). Hier sollen sich Recht-
einhaber und Forschungsorganisationen auf 
bewährte Verfahren einigen (Art. 3 Abs. 4). 
Article 2(1)). The prerequisite is that the 
respective research organization has lawful 
access to the sources searched. The excep-
tion is limited to not-for-profit research 
and research with a public interest objective. 
According to Article 3(2), contrary contrac-
tual provisions are unenforceable. Further-
more, rightholders shall be allowed to apply 
technical measures to ensure the security 
and integrity of networks and databases (Ar-
ticle 3(3)). Rightholders and research organ-
izations should agree on good practices (Ar-
ticle 3(4)). 
4 Eine ähnliche Regelung wurde bereits u.a. 
im Vereinigten Königreich im Jahr 2014 für 
nicht-kommerzielle Forschung umgesetzt. 
In Deutschland werden im Rahmen der De-
batte über die Wissenschaftsschranke ent-
sprechende Vorschläge diskutiert (de la 
Durantaye, Allgemeine Bildungs- und Wis-
senschaftsschranke, 2014; für einen weiter-
gehenden Anwendungsbereich indes 
Schack, ZUM 2016, 266, 269; über die 
Rechtslage zu TDM insgesamt Spindler, 
GRUR 2016, 1112, 1117).     
Similar regulation has already been enact-
ed, inter alia, in the United Kingdom in 2014 
for non-commercial research. In Germany, 
corresponding proposals are discussed in the 
context of the debate on the research exemp-
tion (de la Durantaye, Allgemeine Bildungs- 
und Wissenschaftsschranke, 2014; in favor 
of a broader scope, however, Schack, ZUM 
2016, 266, 269; about the general legal situ-
ation of TDM Spindler, GRUR 2016, 1112, 
1117). 
 
5 Der Entwurf knüpft an Vervielfältigungen 
(Art. 2 Info-Soc-RL) und Entnahmen 
(Art. 7 Abs. 1 Datenbank-RL) als betroffe-
ne Verwertungsrechte an. Würde man 
TDM als urheberrechtlich relevant erachten 
(vgl. hierzu etwa Spindler, „Text und Data 
Mining – urheber- und datenschutzrechtli-
che Fragen“, GRUR 2016, 1112; Stamatou-
di, „Text and Data Mining“, in: Stamatoudi 
(Hrsg.), New Developments in EU and In-
ternational Copyright Law, 2016, 253; Tri-
aille et al., Study on the legal framework of 
text and data mining (TDM), 2014), so wä-
re dies konsequent. Tatsächlich erfordert 
TDM in der Regel eine nicht lediglich tem-
poräre Vervielfältigung, für welche Art. 5 
The draft refers to reproductions (Article 2 
InfoSoc Directive) and extractions (Article 
7(1) Database Directive) as affected exploi-
tation rights. If TDM were considered to be 
relevant for copyright (see, for example, 
Spindler, “Text und Data Mining – urheber- 
und datenschutzrechtliche Fragen”, GRUR 
2016, 1112; Stamatoudi, “Text and Data 
Mining”, in: Stamatoudi (ed.), New Devel-
opments in EU and International Copyright 
Law, 2016, 253; Triaille et al., Study on the 
legal framework of text and data mining 
(TDM), 2014), then this would be con-
sistent. In fact, TDM usually requires a not 
merely temporary reproduction, for which 
Article 5(1)(a) InfoSoc Directive would not 
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Abs. 1 a) InfoSoc-RL nicht greifen würde.    apply. 
6 2. Regelungstechnische Bedenken 
Die vorgeschlagene Regelung suggeriert 
allerdings zu Unrecht, dass die Handlung 
des TDM an sich urheberrechtlich relevant 
ist. Zu pauschal sind die Ausführungen in 
ErwGr. 8, wonach mangels Geltendma-
chung von Ausnahmen oder Beschränkun-
gen eine Genehmigung vom Rechteinhaber 
für TDM eingeholt werden müsse. Denn 
gerade dann, wenn der Nutzer auf Inhalte 
bereits rechtmäßig zugreifen kann (er die 
betreffenden Daten also als solche oder 
Zugang zu ihnen vertraglich erworben hat), 
muss das automatisierte Auswerten dieser 
Inhalte ebenso erlaubt sein, wie das Lesen 
durch den Menschen keiner gesonderten 
Erlaubnis des Rechteinhabers bedarf. 
2. Concerns regarding the regulatory 
method 
However, the proposed rule wrongly sug-
gests that carrying out TDM is per se of 
relevance to copyright. The explanations 
given in Recital 8, according to which an 
authorization to undertake such acts must be 
obtained from rightholders if no exception 
or limitation applies, are too sweeping. Es-
pecially in the case that a user has lawful 
access to contents (the user has acquired the 
relevant data as such or has acquired access 
to them on a contractual basis), the automat-
ed analysis of these contents must be permit-
ted, just as reading by the human being does 
not require any separate consent by the 
rightholder.  
 
7 Der damit suggerierte illusionäre Schutz 
wirkt sich insbesondere in denjenigen Fäl-
len aus, in denen die Vertragsvereinbarung 
zwischen Rechteinhaber und Nutzer keine 
ausdrücklichen Bestimmungen zu TDM 
enthalten. Denn die vorgeschlagene 
Schrankenregelung ließe den Umkehr-
schluss zu, dass TDM eine aufspaltbare 
Nutzungsart darstellt. Ein Schweigen im 
Vertrag wäre folglich dahingehend zu in-
terpretieren, dass sich die vertragliche Be-
rechtigung eben nicht auf TDM bezöge.  
The illusionary protection thus suggested 
has an effect, in particular, in those cases in 
which the contractual agreement between 
the rightholder and the user does not contain 
any express provisions on TDM. The pro-
posed limitation would allow for the conclu-
sion e contrario that TDM is a separable 
type of use. An omission in a contract would 
therefore have to be interpreted in the sense 
that the contractually granted right does not 
refer to TDM. 
8 Die Folgen eines solchen Fehlschlusses 
reichen deswegen weit, weil die vorge-
schlagene Regelung TDM nur nicht ge-
winnorientierten bzw. im unmittelbaren 
öffentlichen Interesse tätigen Forschungs-
organisationen gestatten soll. Damit würden 
Nutzer von TDM für kommerzielle bzw. 
nicht im öffentlichen Interesse liegende 
Forschung zum Abschluss vertraglicher 
Vereinbarungen mit den Rechteinhabern 
gezwungen. Dies entbehrt einer sachlichen 
Rechtfertigung (dazu Ziff. 10-12) und führt 
darüber hinaus zu komplexen Abgrenzungs-
The consequences of such a wrong conclu-
sion are far-reaching, since the proposed 
rule allows TDM to be carried out only by 
not-for-profit research organizations and 
research organizations acting directly in the 
public interest. This would force users of 
TDM to conclude contractual agreements 
with the rightholders for commercial pur-
poses and for research not in the public in-
terest. This lacks a substantive justification 
(see para. 10-12) and also leads to complex 
questions of demarcation in the legal prac-
tice. As a result of the different national im-
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fragen in der Rechtspraxis. Durch zu erwar-
tende Unterschiede in der nationalen Um-
setzung würde die Rechtszersplitterung im 
Binnenmarkt gegenüber heute noch forciert, 
was dem erklärten Ziel der unionsweiten 
Rechtsharmonisierung zuwiderliefe.  
plementations to be expected, the fragmenta-
tion of law in the internal market would be 
pushed even further, which is contrary to the 
declared objective of the Union-wide har-
monization of the law. 
9 Mit Skepsis zu betrachten ist darüber hinaus 
die generelle Vorbildwirkung einer sol-
chen Regelung für die Entwicklung der 
datengetriebenen Wirtschaft: Bei TDM 
dürfte es sich lediglich um eine erste, wenn 
auch wichtige Datenanalysetechnik han-
deln. Diese isoliert einer urheberrechtlichen 
Regelung zu unterwerfen, führte zu einer 
bruchstückhaften und längerfristig inkohä-
renten Rechtsfortentwicklung. Stattdessen 
vermögen nur ganzheitliche, übergeordnete 
Interessenzusammenhänge berücksichti-
gende Regulierungsansätze der gesell-
schaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Bedeu-
tung von Datenanalysen Rechnung zu tra-
gen.  
In addition, the general role model effect of 
such a rule is to be viewed with skepticism 
regarding the development of the data-
driven economy: TDM is to be considered 
only as a first, albeit an important, data 
analysis technique. Submitting TDM to an 
isolated copyright rule would lead to a 
fragmentary and incoherent legal develop-
ment in the longer run. Instead, only holistic 
regulatory approaches that accommodate 
overarching interrelations of interests can 
account for the societal and economic signif-
icance of data analyses. 
 
10 3. Inhaltliche Bedenken 
Der RL-Entwurf geht davon aus, dass TDM 
für die wissenschaftliche Forschung von 
besonderem Nutzen ist und namentlich In-
novationsanreize schafft. Dies trifft zu, darf 
aber nicht zu dem Schluss führen, dass 
TDM für Zwecke jenseits der wissenschaft-
lichen Forschung nicht ebenso hohes Inno-
vations- und Entdeckungspotential birgt, 
etwa für Startups, Journalisten oder Infor-
mationsintermediäre.  
3. Concerns regarding the content 
The Draft Directive assumes that TDM is of 
particular benefit to scientific research and, 
in particular, creates incentives for innova-
tion. While this is true, this must not, how-
ever, lead to the conclusion that TDM does 
not bear the same high potential for inno-
vation and discovery for purposes beyond 
scientific research, e.g. for start-ups, journal-
ists or information intermediaries. 
11 Selbst innerhalb der Forschung will die 
Kommission die Reichweite der vorge-
schlagenen Regelung jedoch auf nicht-
gewinnorientierte Forschungsorganisatio-
nen sowie auf solche beschränken, die in 
staatlich anerkanntem Auftrag im öffentli-
chen Interesse handeln. Letzteres wirft 
ebenso Abgrenzungsprobleme auf wie das 
spezifische Anliegen, auch Public Private 
Partnerships der Regelung zu unterstellen. 
Even within the field of research, however, 
the Commission intends to limit the scope of 
the proposed provision to not-for-profit re-
search organizations and to those pursuing a 
public-interest objective recognized by a 
Member State. The latter raises delimitation 
problems and so does the specific goal to 
submit public-private partnerships to the 
provision. Although the draft aims to add 
contour to the rule by giving a definition 
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Der Entwurf ist zwar um eine Konturierung 
durch Definition bemüht (Art. 2 Abs. 1); 
diese verwendet allerdings eine Vielzahl 
unbestimmter bzw. konkretisierungsbedürf-
tiger Rechtsbegriffe, was langwierige Pro-
zesse unter Involvierung des EuGH als 
Auslegungsinstanz erwarten lässt.  
(Article 2(1)), this definition uses a large 
number of legal terms that are vague or to be 
further defined, which will most likely lead 
to lengthy court procedures involving the 
CJEU as an interpreting instance. 
 
12 Ein Einbezug auch gewinnorientierter – und 
auch rein privatwirtschaftlicher – For-
schung in eine Regelung zu TDM vermei-
det nicht nur die besagten Abgrenzungs-
probleme. Noch viel wichtiger ist, dass dies  
die Position forschender Unternehmen in 
der Europäischen Union gegenüber Wett-
bewerbern stärken wird, die entsprechenden 
Restriktionen nicht unterworfen sind. 
Including profit-oriented – and also purely 
private – research in a provision on TDM 
would avoid not only the aforementioned 
delimitation problems. More importantly, 
this would strengthen the position of re-
search-based companies in the European 
Union against their competitors who are not 
subjected to similar restrictions.  
13 III. Alternativer Regelungsvorschlag 
1. TDM als bestimmungsgemäßer Ge-
brauch  
Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Bedenken wird 
hier ein alternativer Regelungsvorschlag 
unterbreitet. Dieser beruht zunächst darauf, 
dass die Durchführung von TDM an sich – 
wie eingangs beschrieben (Ziff. 6) – ebenso 
wenig eine urheberrechtliche Relevanz ent-
faltet wie ein sonstiger, irgendwie gearteter 
Werkgenuss, namentlich das Lesen und 
Erfassen von Zusammenhängen durch einen 
Menschen. Genauso wie die Lektüre dem 
bestimmungsgemäßen Gebrauch analoger 
Schriftwerke entspricht, das Urheberrecht 
der Kenntnisnahme von Inhalten also nicht 
entgegensteht, liegt der bestimmungsge-
mäße Gebrauch digital gespeicherter 
Inhalte im Lichte der heutigen Technolo-
gien darin, enthaltene Informationen auto-
matisiert aufzufinden und in eine Korrelati-
on zu stellen. In gewissem Sinne vergleich-
bar definiert etwa Art. 5 Abs. 3 der RL 
2009/24 (Software-RL) den bestimmungs-
gemäßen Gebrauch von Computerpro-
grammen dahingehend, dass die zur Nut-
zung berechtigten Person eine Programm-
kopie „ohne die Genehmigung des Rechts-
III. Alternative regulatory proposal 
1. TDM as normal use 
Against the background of these concerns, 
an alternative regulatory proposal is present-
ed here. In the first place, the proposal is 
based on the fact that the performance of 
TDM as such – as described at the outset 
(see para. 6) – has no more relevance under 
copyright than any other kind of use of the 
work, in particular the reading and compre-
hension of connections by a human being. 
Just as reading corresponds to the normal 
use of analogue written works (this aware-
ness of contents does not conflict with copy-
right), the normal use of digitally stored 
content lies – in the light of today’s tech-
nologies – in automatically finding and cor-
relating the information it contains. In a 
sense comparable, Article 5(3) of Directive 
2009/24 (Software Directive) defines the 
normal use of computer programs such that 
“[t]he person having a right to use a copy of 
a computer program shall be entitled, with-
out the authorization of the rightholder, to 
observe, study or test the functioning of the 
program in order to determine the ideas and 
principles which underlie any element of the 
program“ (see also Recital 13). 
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inhabers … das Funktionieren dieses Pro-
gramms beobachten, untersuchen oder tes-
ten [darf], um die einem Programmelement 
zugrundeliegenden Ideen und Grundsätze 
zu ermitteln“ (s.a. ErwGr. 13).  
 
 
14 Das Besondere an TDM liegt allerdings 
darin, dass dem eigentlichen Vorgang an 
sich regelmäßig ein Vervielfältigungspro-
zess vorgeschaltet werden muss, da die 
einbezogenen Datensätze üblicherweise in 
unterschiedlichen Formaten vorliegen und 
daher zum Zwecke des übergreifenden au-
tomatisierten Durchsuchens zuerst normali-
siert werden müssen (und je nachdem auch 
einer Taxonomie zu unterziehen sind). Die-
ser Vorgang ist auf den ersten Blick ver-
gleichbar mit dem sog. „format-shifting“ 
(etwa von einem analogen auf einen digita-
len Träger), welches unweigerlich zu einer 
Vervielfältigung führt.  
However, the special feature of TDM is that 
the actual process of TDM itself is usually 
preceded by a reproduction, since the da-
tasets involved are usually available in dif-
ferent formats and must therefore be normal-
ized for the purpose of the comprehensive 
automated search (and, as the case may be, 
undergo a taxonomy). At first sight, this 
process is comparable to so-called “format-
shifting” (for example, from an analogue to 
a digital carrier), which inevitably leads to a 
reproduction. 
15 Je nachdem, auf welche Quellen das TDM 
zurückgreift, können darüber hinaus durch 
die Datenbank-RL geschützte Datenbanken 
betroffen sein. Mit der erwähnten Normali-
sierung kann je nachdem eine zustim-
mungsbedürftige Entnahme einhergehen, 
die Art. 7 Abs. 2 a) der Datenbank-RL defi-
niert als „ständige oder vorübergehende 
Übertragung der Gesamtheit oder eines 
wesentlichen Teils des Inhalts einer Daten-
bank auf einen anderen Datenträger, unge-
achtet der dafür verwendeten Mittel und der 
Form der Entnahme“. 
Depending on the sources on which the 
TDM is based, databases that are protected 
subject-matter under the Database Directive 
can also be affected. The stated normaliza-
tion might constitute an extraction, which 
requires consent, and is defined as “the per-
manent or temporary transfer of all or a sub-
stantial part of the contents of a database to 
another medium by any means or in any 
form” (Art. 7(2)(a) Database Directive).  
 
16 Weder die erforderliche Entnahme aus Da-
tenbanken noch die im Rahmen der erfor-
derlichen Normalisierung entstehende Ver-
vielfältigung eröffnet dem Nutzer jedoch – 
anders als z.B. beim „format-shifting“ – 
eine eigenständige Nutzungsmöglichkeit. 
Vielmehr sind diese Vorgänge technisch 
notwendig, um TDM überhaupt durchzu-
führen, wie auch etwa für die Nutzung von 
Software eine Vervielfältigung unausweich-
lich ist. Aus diesem Grunde bestimmt Art. 5 
Abs. 1 der Software-RL, dass für eine dau-
Neither the necessary extraction from data-
bases nor the reproduction resulting from the 
required normalization allows the user an 
independent use, however (unlike e.g. for-
mat-shifting). Rather, these processes are 
technically necessary in order to carry out 
TDM at all, just as, for example, a reproduc-
tion is unavoidable for the use of software. 
For this reason, Article 5(1) of the Software 
Directive provides that a permanent or tem-
porary reproduction of software according to 
Article 4(1)(a) of the same Directive “shall 
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erhafte oder vorübergehende Vervielfälti-
gung von Software i.S.v. Art. 4 Abs. 1 a) 
derselben RL „nicht der Zustimmung des 
Rechtsinhabers [bedarf], wenn sie für eine 
bestimmungsgemäße Benutzung des Com-
puterprogramms … notwendig sind“. Damit 
wird im Verhältnis zum sehr weit gefassten 
Vervielfältigungsbegriff in Art. 2 der Info-
Soc-RL eine spezifische Bereichsausnahme 
geschaffen, die über den von seinem Zweck 
her sehr viel engeren Art. 5 Abs. 1 der In-
foSoc-RL hinausgeht.  
not require authorization by the rightholder 
where they are necessary for the use of the 
computer program”. Thus, in relation to the 
very broad concept of reproduction in Art. 2 
of the InfoSoc Directive, a specific field 
exemption is created that goes beyond the 
much narrower rationale of Art. 5(1) of the 
InfoSoc Directive. 
17 Bezogen auf TDM gilt nichts anderes, so-
weit es sich um Inhalte handelt, zu denen 
die durchführenden Personen rechtmäßigen 
Zugang haben. Das hier vorgeschlagene 
Regelungsmodell läuft m.a.W. auf eine 
weitere, spezifische Bereichsausnahme hin-
aus, die daran anknüpft, dass das Durchfüh-
ren von TDM als solches der Zustimmung 
des Rechteinhabers ebenso wenig bedarf 
wie Handlungen i.S.v. Art. 5 Abs. 3 der 
Software-RL. Um TDM überhaupt vor-
nehmen zu können, sind indessen ebenso 
Vervielfältigungen notwendig, wie sie dem 
rechtmäßigen Nutzer von Software nach 
Art. 5 Abs. 1 der Software-RL erlaubt sind. 
Das bedeutet, dass Art. 2 der InfoSoc-RL 
solche Vervielfältigungen nicht erfasst. 
Gleiches gilt mit Bezug auf gewisse Ent-
nahmen von Datenbankinhalten, die zum 
Zwecke des TDM erforderlich sind. 
Nothing else applies regarding TDM, as far 
as concerns content to which the persons 
performing the mining have lawful access. 
In other words, the regulatory model sug-
gested here constitutes another specific field 
exemption based on the fact that the perfor-
mance of TDM as such, like acts under Art. 
5(3) of the Software Directive, does not re-
quire the consent of the rightholder. In order 
to be able to carry out TDM at all, however, 
reproductions are just as necessary as they 
are permitted to the lawful user of software 
pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Software Di-
rective. This means that Art. 2 InfoSoc Di-
rective does not cover such reproductions. 
The same applies with regard to certain ex-
tractions from database contents that are 
necessary for the purposes of TDM. 
18 Das vorgeschlagene Regelungsmodell er-
mächtigt nicht jeden Dritten zu TDM, son-
dern allein jenen Nutzer, dem der Rechtein-
haber selbst Zugang zu den davon erfassten 
Quellen gewährt hat. Genauso wie ein 
Rechteinhaber, der Nutzern Software zum 
Gebrauch überlässt, davon ausgehen muss, 
dass anlässlich der Nutzung Vervielfälti-
gungen und Handlungen i.S.v. Art. 5 Abs. 1 
bzw. Abs. 3 der Software-RL erfolgen, 
muss der Rechteinhaber dann von der 
Durchführung von TDM ausgehen, wenn er 
dergestalt den Zugang zu Quellen ermög-
The proposed regulatory model does not 
entitle any third party to carry out TDM, but 
only the user to whom the rightholder has 
granted access to the sources affected by it. 
Just as a rightholder who allows users to use 
software must assume that reproductions 
and other actions according to Article 5(1) 
and (3) of the Software Directive are per-
formed, the rightholder must assume that 
TDM is carried out if he allows access to 
sources in a manner that enables TDM. 
Therefore, in principle, an “implied license” 
is to be assumed – comparable to the provi-
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licht, dass TDM möglich ist. Mithin ist – 
vergleichbar mit der Regelung in der Soft-
ware-RL – im Prinzip von einer „implied 
license“ auszugehen (Grützmacher, in: 
Wandtke/Bullinger, UrhR, 4. Aufl., § 69d, 
Rn. 3 m.w.N.).  
sion in the Software Directive 
(Grützmacher, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, 
UrhR, 4th edition, § 69d, para. 3 with further 
references). 
19 Damit liegt der Sinn der vorgeschlagenen 
gesetzlichen Regelung in erster Linie darin, 
die zulässige Reichweite abweichender 
vertraglicher Absprachen – namentlich 
solcher, die TDM verbieten würden – zu 
bestimmen. Aus der Regelung folgt ein 
unabdingbarer Kern zulässiger Handlungen 
des bestimmungsgemäßen Nutzers, indem 
entgegenstehende Vertragsbestimmungen 
unwirksam sein müssen (in diesem Sinne 
schon Art. 8 Abs. 2 der Software-RL). Ge-
nau dieses Anliegen spiegelt sich auch in 
Art. 3 Abs. 2 des RL-Entwurfs der Kom-
mission.  
Thus, the purpose of the proposed rule is 
primarily to determine the permissible range 
of divergent contractual arrangements, in 
particular those which would prohibit TDM. 
The rule constitutes an indispensable core of 
permitted acts of the intended user, as it ren-
ders contrary contractual terms void (in this 
sense, Article 8(2) of the Software Di-
rective). Article 3(2) of the Commission’s 
Draft Directive also reflects this concern. 
20 Entscheidender Grund dafür, dass jene Nut-
zer, die rechtmäßigen Zugang zu den ver-
wendeten Quellen haben, TDM ohne Zu-
stimmung des Rechteinhabers durchführen 
können müssen, ist der Umstand, dass von 
dessen Seite keine spezifischen Vorkeh-
rungen erforderlich sind, um TDM zu 
ermöglichen. Vielmehr kann der Nutzer die 
vorstehend genannte Normalisierung 
grundsätzlich selbst durchführen, auch 
wenn dies weder zwingend ist noch unbe-
dingt sinnvoll bzw. effizient erscheint.  
The decisive reason for the fact that those 
users who have legal access to the sources 
used must be able to carry out TDM without 
the consent of the rightholder lies in the fact 
that the rightholder does not need to take 
any specific actions to enable TDM. Rather, 
the user can basically perform the above-
mentioned normalization himself, even if 
this is neither necessary nor particularly 
meaningful or efficient. 
21 2. Weitführende Geschäftsmodelle auf 
vertraglicher Basis  
Rechteinhabern (wie z.B. Wissenschafts-
verlegern) stehen gerade vor diesem Hin-
tergrund neue Geschäftmodelle offen, die 
sie bislang eher vereinzelt im Verhältnis zu 
gewissen, TDM betreibenden Industrien 
nutzen. Für diese wie auch für Forscher 
kann es von Interesse sein, den vorgelager-
ten Schritt der Normalisierung nicht selbst 
vorzunehmen, sondern einen spezialisierten 
2. Advanced business models on a con-
tractual basis 
Against this background, new business 
models are available to the rightholders 
(such as scientific publishers), who have so 
far used them in rather isolated cases in rela-
tion to certain TDM-driven industries. Such 
industries, as well as researchers, may prefer 
not to undertake the normalization step 
themselves, but to involve a specialized 
third party. Should those users who are not 
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Dritten hinzuzuziehen. Denn versuchen es 
jene nicht darauf spezialisierten Nutzer 
selbst, die rechtmäßigen Zugang zu den 
erfassten Inhalten haben, führt dies keines-
wegs ohne weiteres zu einem Datensatz, der 
erforderlich ist, um optimale Ergebnisse des 
TDM zu erzielen. Dies eröffnet in erster 
Linie den Rechteinhabern selbst die Mög-
lichkeit, von Nutzern bezeichnete Inhalte 
technisch so aufzubereiten, dass das TDM 
von diesen dann ohne weiteres unmittelbar 
durchgeführt werden kann.  
specialized and who have lawful access to 
the recorded content perform the normaliza-
tion themselves, this does not simply pro-
duce a dataset that is necessary to achieve 
optimal results of TDM. This primarily 
opens up the possibility for the rightholders 
to technically process content designated by 
users, who can then directly carry out TDM. 
22 Solche Dienstleistungen beziehen sich aber 
nur auf die notwendigen Vorbereitungs-
maßnahmen, d.h. auf die Normalisierung 
und die damit einhergehenden Vervielfälti-
gungen. Insoweit kommt die vorstehend 
genannte Bereichsausnahme zugunsten der 
rechtmäßigen Nutzer zwar nicht zum Zug. 
Dies ändert aber nichts daran, dass das ei-
gentliche TDM keiner Einwilligung des 
Rechteinhabers bedarf, weil dieses von 
vornherein keine urheberrechtlich relevante 
Nutzung von Werken darstellt (dazu vor-
stehend Ziff. 6). Wohl wird ein Rechteinha-
ber für die Normalisierung von Daten eine 
Vergütung verlangen; diese bezieht sich 
aber nicht etwa auf das TDM an sich. Mit 
andern Worten bedeutet die Inanspruch-
nahme der Dienstleistung des Rechteinha-
bers lediglich, dass der Nutzer, der recht-
mäßig Zugang zu den erfassten Inhalten 
hat, darauf verzichtet, die erforderlichen 
Vervielfältigungen selbst vorzunehmen, 
ohne dass sich am Grundsatz, dass TDM an 
sich zustimmungsfrei erlaubt ist, etwas än-
dert. 
Such services, however, relate only to the 
necessary preparatory measures, namely 
to the normalization and the corresponding 
reproductions. In this respect, the above-
mentioned field exemption for the benefit of 
legitimate users does not come into play. 
However, this does not alter the fact that the 
actual TDM does not require the consent of 
the rightholder, since this does not constitute 
a copyright-relevant use of works from the 
outset (on this, see para. 6). It is true that a 
rightholder will demand compensation for 
the normalization of data; but such compen-
sation does not refer to the TDM itself. In 
other words, the use of the service of the 
rightholder simply means that the user who 
has lawful access to the contents covered 
does not make the necessary reproductions 
himself, but this does not change the princi-
ple that TDM in itself is permitted without 
the need for consent. 
23 Rechteinhabern bleibt es unbenommen, die 
Preise für solche auf vertraglicher Basis 
erbrachte Dienstleistungen zu differenzie-
ren. Dies kann sich dann rechtfertigen, 
wenn TDM von kommerziellen Nutzern 
dazu eingesetzt wird, Wettbewerbschancen 
zu erhöhen und damit entsprechende Ge-
Rightholders still remain free to differentiate 
the prices for such services provided on a 
contractual basis. This can be justified in 
situations where commercial users perform 
TDM to increase their chances in competi-
tion and to achieve corresponding profits. 
Such users in particular are already working 
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winne zu erzielen. Gerade solche Nutzer 
arbeiten teilweise heute schon mit Recht-
einhabern (z.B. mit Wissenschaftsverlagen) 
zusammen, womit entsprechende Ge-
schäftsmodelle in der Entwicklung begrif-
fen sind. Auch vor diesem Hintergrund ist 
nicht ersichtlich, wieso kommerzielle Nut-
zer nicht ebenfalls in die vorgeschlagene 
Regelung einzubeziehen sein sollen. Ge-
winnorientierte Nutzer werden primär nach 
Effizienzgesichtspunkten entscheiden, wie 
sie TDM durchführen. Oft werden sie an-
gemessenen Angeboten von Rechteinha-
bern gegenüber aufwendigeren eigenen 
Normalisierungen von Inhalten – auch 
wenn sie selbst Zugang zu diesen hätten – 
oft den Vorzug geben. 
together with rightholders (for example with 
scientific publishers), with corresponding 
business models under development. 
Against this background as well, it is not 
clear why commercial users should not be 
included in the proposed provision. Profit-
oriented users will primarily follow efficien-
cy considerations for deciding how to carry 
out TDM. They will often prefer appropriate 
services of rightholders to their own, more 
complex normalizations of content, even if 
they have access to it. 
24 Rechteinhaber sind nach der vorgeschlage-
nen Regelung auch nicht übermäßiger 
Konkurrenz ausgeliefert. Die für das 
TDM erforderlichen Vervielfältigungen 
sind nämlich nur jenem Nutzer erlaubt, der 
eigenen rechtmäßigen Zugang zu den er-
fassten Inhalten hat und das eigentliche 
TDM selbst durchführen will. Dies schließt 
aus, dass Dritte entsprechende Dienstleis-
tungen anbieten und insoweit in einen 
Wettbewerb mit den Rechteinhabern eintre-
ten könnten. Wohl mögen Dritte ihrerseits 
Zugang zu einer breiten Palette von Inhal-
ten erlangen, doch ohne anschließendes 
eigenes TDM fallen sie nicht unter die hier 
vorgeschlagene Bereichsausnahme zum 
allgemeinen Vervielfältigungs- und Ent-
nahmerecht.  
Under the proposed rules, rightholders are 
also not exposed to excessive competition. 
Only the user who has his own lawful access 
to the recorded content and who wants to 
carry out the actual TDM himself is allowed 
to make the reproductions required for 
TDM. This excludes the possibility for third 
parties to offer similar services and to thus 
compete with the rightholders. Though third 
parties may gain access to a wide range of 
content, they do not fall under the field ex-
emption from the general rights of reproduc-
tion and extraction proposed here as long as 
they do not carry out TDM themselves. 
 
 
25 3. TDM bezogen auf Inhalte, zu denen 
kein Zugang besteht 
Ein Problem, mit dem sich insbesondere 
Forschungsorganisationen konfrontiert se-
hen, besteht in Bezug auf TDM über Inhal-
te, zu denen kein (rechtmäßiger) Zugang 
besteht. Gerade kleinere Forschungsorgani-
sationen, die kostenbedingt nur einge-
schränkten Zugang zu Inhalten haben, ste-
3. TDM related to non-accessible content 
A particular problem faced by research or-
ganizations relates to TDM of content to 
which there is no (lawful) access. Smaller 
research organizations, in particular, with 
only limited access to content, are already 
facing the challenge of being able to com-
pete internationally. This problem will be 
exacerbated by the fact that the field exemp-
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hen bereits heute vor der Herausforderung, 
im internationalen Wettbewerb mithalten zu 
können. Dieses Problem wird sich noch 
dadurch verschärfen, dass die Bereichsaus-
nahme für TDM rechtmäßigen Zugang vo-
raussetzt und somit den Vorsprung der we-
nigen, großen, finanzkräftigen Forschungs-
organisationen effektiv noch vergrößern 
würde.  
tion for TDM requires lawful access, thus 
effectively increasing the lead of the fewer, 
large and financially strong research organi-
zations. 
26 Forschungsorganisationen muss es daher 
möglich sein, TDM auch durchführen zu 
können, ohne Zugang zu den Inhalten selbst 
erwerben zu müssen. Tatsächlich besteht 
seitens gewisser Anbieter von Inhalten be-
reits heute die Praxis, auf den Zweck des 
TDM normalisierte Datensätzen bereitzu-
stellen, ohne dass den Nutzern damit 
gleichzeitig Zugang zu den einbezogenen 
Inhalten gewährt wird. Vielmehr muss der 
eigentliche Zugang zu wissenschaftlichen 
Inhalten gegebenenfalls separat (kosten-
pflichtig) erworben werden. Dabei stellt die 
Bereitstellung normalisierter Daten allein 
zum Zwecke des TDM durchaus ein Ge-
schäftsmodell dar, zumal ein Rechteinhaber 
diese Dienstleistung naturgemäß entweder 
gegen Entgelt anbieten wird oder sich ande-
re, indirekte Gewinnchancen daraus erhofft. 
Flächendeckend existiert diese Praxis in-
dessen keineswegs, und zugunsten von For-
schungsorganisationen ist sie, soweit er-
sichtlich, überhaupt noch nicht entwickelt 
(vgl. für eine aktuelle Übersicht der TDM-
Politiken von Wissenschaftverlagen Cas-
pers/Guibault, Baseline report of policies 
and barriers of TDM in Europe, 2016, S. 84 
ff.). Gerade hier wäre sie aufgrund des ge-
nannten beschränkten Zugangs zu wissen-
schaftlicher Information aber von besonde-
rem Interesse und Nutzen.   
Research organizations must therefore also 
be able to carry out TDM without having to 
acquire access to the content themselves. In 
fact, in practice certain providers of content 
already provide normalized datasets for the 
purpose of TDM without giving the users 
access to the content. Rather, the actual ac-
cess to scientific content must be acquired 
(and paid for) separately. Indeed, the provi-
sion of normalized data solely for the pur-
pose of TDM is a business model, especially 
since a rightholder will either offer this ser-
vice for payment or hopes for other, indirect 
profit opportunities. However, this practice 
is far from being comprehensive, and – as 
far as can be seen – it has not yet been de-
veloped with research organizations in mind 
at all (see for a recent overview of the TDM 
policies of scientific research publishers 
Casper/Guibault, Baseline report of policies 
and barriers of TDMs in Europe, 2016, p. 84 
et seq.). However, such a practice would be 
of particular interest and benefit, given the 
stated limited access to scientific research 
information. 
27 Entsprechend verpflichtet die hier vorge-
schlagene Regelung Rechteinhaber, For-
schungsorganisationen (wie sie Art. 2 des 
RL-Entwurfs bereits definiert) Datensätze 
Accordingly, the proposed provision obliges 
rightholders to provide datasets to research 
organizations (as defined in Article 2 of the 
Draft Directive) that exclusively allow them 
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
24 of 27 
bereitzustellen, die ihnen ausschließlich 
TDM ermöglichen. Diese Pflicht trifft frei-
lich nur solche Rechteinhaber, die Inhalte 
überwiegend zu Forschungszwecken ver-
markten. Dabei schreibt die Norm nicht vor, 
wie genau diese Bereitstellung zu verwirk-
lichen ist. Vielmehr reicht es, wenn durch 
die Verpflichtung Anreize zur Selbstregu-
lierung geschaffen werden. Je offener die 
Norm ist, desto eher ermöglicht sie auch 
Kooperationen zwischen Rechteinhabern 
komplementärer Inhalte mit Bezug auf der-
artige Geschäftsmodelle. 
to carry out TDM. This obligation applies, 
of course, only to those rightholders who 
market content primarily for research pur-
poses. The provision does not stipulate how 
this provision of datasets is to be imple-
mented in particular. Rather, it is sufficient 
if the obligation creates incentives for self-
regulation. The more open the provision is, 
the more likely it is to allow co-operation 
between rightholders of complementary con-
tent with regard to such business models. 
28 Rechtfertigen lässt sich eine solche Ver-
pflichtung nicht nur dadurch, dass die 
Rechteinhaber für die Bereitstellung ihrer 
normalisierten Daten ein angemessenes 
Entgelt verlangen können. Entscheidend ist 
vielmehr, dass bereitgestellte normalisierte 
Daten nur beschränkt als Substitute für 
den Zugang zu den eigentlich Inhalten die-
nen können. Die bloße Möglichkeit des 
TDM ersetzt die Kenntnisse über den For-
schungsstand einer bestimmten Disziplin 
aber nicht. TDM stellt lediglich einen mög-
lichen Forschungsansatz dar, der allerdings 
deswegen besonders wichtig ist, weil die 
daraus gewonnen Erkenntnisse ihrerseits 
Gegenstand neuer Publikationen sein kön-
nen. Soll dieser zeitgemäße Forschungsan-
satz nicht durch fehlende faktische Verfüg-
barkeit normalisierter Daten behindert wer-
den, ist eine Pflicht zur Bereitstellung da-
hingehend unumgänglich, dass TDM auch 
mit Bezug auf Inhalte ermöglicht wird, zu 
denen kein rechtmäßiger Zugang besteht. 
Zwar mag man ein Restrisiko darin sehen, 
dass TDM-fähige Datensätze so verwendet 
(und z.B. „rückkonvertiert“) werden könn-
ten, dass sich damit der Zugang zu den In-
halten substituieren ließe. Dies setzt aller-
dings nicht nur einen gewissen Aufwand 
voraus; mit einer Rückkonvertierung ver-
bunden wäre letztlich auch wiederum eine 
Vervielfältigung seitens jener Partei, der 
Such an obligation can be justified by the 
fact that the rightholders are entitled to re-
quest a reasonable payment for the provision 
of their normalized data. What is crucial is 
that the normalized data provided can only 
serve as a substitute for access to the actual 
content to a limited extent. The mere possi-
bility to perform TDM does not, however, 
replace the knowledge of a particular re-
search discipline’s current state. TDM is 
merely a possible research approach, which, 
however, is particularly important because 
the knowledge gained can be the subject of 
new publications. If this modern research 
approach is not to be hampered by a lack of 
factual availability of normalized data, it is 
indispensable that TDM also be made possi-
ble with respect to content that is not lawful-
ly accessible. A residual risk may be seen in 
the fact that TDM-capable data sets could be 
used (and e.g. “converted back”) in a way 
that would allow for the substitution of ac-
cess to the content. However, this does not 
only require a certain amount of effort; the 
back-conversion would ultimately also con-
stitute a reproduction on the part of the party 
to which the TDM-capable data sets have 
been made available. However, such a re-
production lacks not only the contractual 
consent of the concerned rightholders, but 
also a statutory authorization. A back-
conversion of purely TDM-capable data sets 
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rein TDM-fähige Datensätze zur Verfügung 
gestellt werden. Für eine solche Vervielfäl-
tigung fehlte aber nicht nur naturgemäß die 
vertragliche Zustimmung der betroffenen 
Rechteinhaber, sondern auch eine gesetzli-
che Ermächtigung. Eine Rückkonvertierung 
von rein TDM-fähigen Datensätzen wäre 
mithin illegal. 
would therefore be illegal. 
29 4. Notwendigkeit und Bedeutung techni-
scher Schutzmaßnahmen 
Es versteht sich von selbst, dass ein Zugriff 
zum Zwecke des TDM auf Netze und Da-
tenbanken von Rechteinhabern mit gewis-
sen Gefahren verbunden ist. Dies gilt im 
Prinzip unabhängig davon, ob der Nutzer 
rechtmäßigen Zugang zu den Inhalten hat 
oder nicht, denn die Vermarktung gerade 
wissenschaftlicher Information erfolgt heu-
te ohnehin oft nicht mehr dadurch, dass 
Daten dauerhaft transferiert werden. Ent-
sprechend muss es einem Rechteinhaber 
möglich sein, seine berechtigten Interessen 
dadurch zu schützen, dass er gewisse tech-
nische Maßnahmen ergreift. Allerdings 
dürfen diese nicht weiter reichen als erfor-
derlich, d.h. es ist zu vermeiden, dass tech-
nische Schutzvorkehrungen TDM unnötig 
erschweren oder gar de facto unmöglich 
machen.  
4. The need and importance of technical 
protection measures 
It goes without saying that access to the 
networks and databases of rightholders for 
the purpose of TDM is associated with cer-
tain risks. This applies in principle irrespec-
tive of whether the user has lawful access to 
the content or not, since the marketing of 
scientific information in particular nowadays 
often no longer requires permanent data 
transfers. Accordingly, a rightholder must be 
able to protect his legitimate interests by 
taking certain technical measures. Howev-
er, such measures must not go beyond what 
is required, i.e. technical protection 
measures must be precluded from making 
TDM unnecessarily more difficult or even 
de facto impossible. 
30 5. Aufbewahrung und Zugänglichma-
chung 
Soweit die Rechteinhaber selbst die Norma-
lisierung der Daten vornehmen und diese 
lediglich zum Zwecke des TDM bereitstel-
len, haben sie es in der Hand, nicht autori-
sierte Verwendungen dieser Daten auszu-
schließen. Erfolgt die Normalisierung hin-
gegen durch jene, die TDM durchführen, 
bleibt der betreffende Datensatz – soweit er 
nach erfolgtem TDM nicht vernichtet wird 
– unter deren Kontrolle. Handelt es sich 
dabei im Prinzip um eine Vervielfältigung 
(Ziff. 14), für welche die vorgeschlagene 
5. Storage and accessibility  
In so far as the rightholders themselves carry 
out the normalization of the data and only 
provide them for the purpose of the TDM, 
they have the power to exclude unauthorized 
uses of these data. If, on the other hand, 
normalization is carried out by those users 
who carry out TDM, the dataset remains 
under their control, provided that it is not 
destroyed after the TDM has been carried 
out. If, in principle, this is a reproduction 
(para. 14), for which the proposed standard 
provides for a field exemption for the bene-
fit of the party that intends to carry out 
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Norm zugunsten jener Partei, die TDM 
selbst durchführen will, eine Bereichsaus-
nahme vorsieht, so folgt daraus, dass solche 
Datensätze nicht Dritten überlassen werden 
dürfen. Entsprechend sind sie so aufzube-
wahren, dass unautorisierte Nutzungen 
durch Dritte verhindert werden.  
TDM, it follows that such datasets may not 
be left in the hands of third parties. Accord-
ingly, they are to be stored in such a way as 
to prevent unauthorized uses by third par-
ties. 
31 Umgekehrt stellt sich in beiden Fällen die 
für die Praxis sehr wichtige Frage, inwie-
weit überhaupt eine Verpflichtung besteht, 
entsprechende Datensätze aufzubewahren, 
nachdem das TDM durchgeführt worden 
ist. Gerade im Bereich der Forschung be-
steht ein gesteigertes Interesse an der Ve-
rifizierbarkeit von Forschungsergebnis-
sen. Diese kann bedingen, dass die betref-
fenden Datensätze erhalten bleiben und für 
Zwecke der Nachprüfung verfügbar ge-
macht werden können, soweit nicht sicher-
gestellt ist, dass eine erneute Normalisie-
rung und wiederholtes TDM zu identischen 
Ergebnissen führt. Folgt daraus die Not-
wendigkeit einer Aufbewahrung verwende-
ter Datensätze, müssen in allen Mitglied-
staaten Einrichtungen bestehen, bei denen 
die betreffenden Datensätze dergestalt hin-
terlegt werden können, dass jedem Angehö-
rigen der EU diskriminierungsfrei die er-
forderlichen Verifizierungen möglich sind.   
 
Conversely, in both cases, a very important 
question for practice is whether there is any 
obligation to retain the corresponding da-
tasets after TDM has been carried out. In the 
field of scientific research there is a particu-
larly strong interest in the verifiability of 
research results. This may determine that 
the relevant datasets have to be retained and 
made available for the purpose of verifica-
tion, unless it can be ensured that re-
normalization and repeated TDM leads to in 
identical results. If it is necessary to store 
the datasets used in the research, all Member 
States must have facilities for storing the 
relevant datasets in such a way as to allow 
any EU national without discrimination to 
make the necessary verifications. 
 IV. Formulierungsvorschlag 
 
Artikel 3 




Wer rechtmäßig Zugang zu Werken 
oder sonstigen Schutzgegenständen hat, 
darf ohne Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers 
Text- und Data-Mining vornehmen. 
2
Das 
schließt die Befugnis mit ein, ausschließlich 
zum Zweck des Text und Data-Mining In-










A person is allowed, without the 
rightholder’s consent, to carry out text and 
data mining related to works or other sub-
ject-matter to which this person has lawful 
access. 
2
This includes, for the sole purpose 
of text and data mining, the permission to 
extract contents of databases and to make 
reproductions. 
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(2) 
1
Rechteinhaber, die Werke und sonstige 
Schutzgegenstände überwiegend zu For-
schungszwecken vermarkten, sind gegen-
über Forschungsorganisationen, die dazu 
keinen rechtmäßigen Zugang haben, ver-
pflichtet, Datensätze bereit zu stellen, die 
ihnen ausschließlich Text- und Data-Mining 
ermöglichen. 
2
Sie können ein angemessenes 
Entgelt verlangen. 
 
(3) Vertragliche Bestimmungen, die im 
Widerspruch zu Absatz 1 oder Absatz 2 




Rechteinhaber sind berechtigt, die für 
die Gewährleistung der Sicherheit und In-
tegrität der Netze und Datenbanken not-
wendigen Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. 
2
Solche Maßnahmen dürfen Text- und Da-
ta-Mining nicht unnötig erschweren. 
 
(5) Die Mitgliedstaaten bezeichnen eine 
Einrichtung, welche die für Text- und Data-
Mining verwendeten Datensätze sicher und 
ausschließlich für Zwecke der Nachprüfung 
zugänglich aufbewahren kann. 
(2) 
1
Rightholders who market works or other 
subject-matter primarily for research pur-
poses are obliged to provide research organ-
izations not having lawful access with da-
tasets that enable them to carry out text and 
data mining only. 
2
These rightholders may 
request a reasonable payment. 
 
 
(3) Any contractual provision contrary to the 
rights and obligations provided for in para-





Rightholders shall be allowed to apply 
measures necessary to ensure the security 
and integrity of the networks and databases. 
2
Such measures shall not unnecessarily 
hamper text and data mining. 
 
 
(5) The Member States shall designate a 
facility to safely store datasets used for text 
and data mining and to make them accessi-
ble for verification purposes only. 
 
 
 
 
 
